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SECTION ON TAXATION
EDITOR'S NOTE: The opportunity for intensive study of various
phases of taxation provided by the broad scope of tax course
offerings has been productive of many tax articles of real interest.
Those selected for publication are included in this section of the
Review.
The course offerings in taxation at the Marshall-Wythe
School of Law include Survey of Tax Literature, Basic Federal
Taxation, State and Local Taxation, Tax Administration and
Procedure, Adjective Tax Law, Preparation of Tax Forms,
Estate and Gift Taxation, Advanced Income Taxation, and Tax
Research. Most of these course offerings are open to second-
and third-year law students on an elective basis. All are required
for the Degree of Master of Law and Taxation.
The Master of Law and Taxation Degree was instituted at
the Marshall-Wythe School of Law for the purpose of providing
an opportunity for added scope and depth in the study of, and
inquiry into, tax policy, theory and practice. Prerequisites for
this degree, in addition to academic baccalaureate and law de-
grees and the courses in Taxation listed above, include the
following undergraduate courses in the fields of Business Ad-
ministration and Economics: Advanced Accounting, Cost
Accounting, Auditing, Municipal and Governmental Accounting,
Money and Banking, Statistics, Corporate Finance, Investments,
Public Finance and National Financial Policy, and Government
Regulation of Business.
A contributing factor to the interest in the study of taxation
has been the papers presented at a Conference on the History
and Philosophy of Taxation held at the College of William and
Mary in 1955. These papers include "History of Taxation in
the United States" by Randolph Paul; "Basic Tax Issues" by
Roy Blough; "The Tax Court of the United States, Its Origin
and Functions" by Bolon B. Turner; "Enforcement" by E. Barrett
Prettyman; "Influence of the Courts on Tax Policy" by Joel
Barlow; "Accounting Theory and Taxation" by Mark E. Rich-
ardson; and "The Role of Taxation in a Free Enterprise System"
by C. Lowell Harriss.
TAXATION
The study of taxation has been given further encourage-
ment by papers presented each year at the Annual Tidewater
Tax Conference sponsored by the Marshall-Wythe School of
Law. Some of these papers have been published in earlier
volumes of this Review.
The subject matter covered by tax articles contributed by
students and others interested in the field of taxation and pub-
lished in the Law Review for the years 1957 through 1962 is
indicated by the following tides:
The Tax Practice Controversy in Historical Perspective.
Joseph V. Anderson, 1957, vol. 1, no. 1, p. 18.
Virginia Income Taxation of Individuals-Some Comparisons
with the Federal Law. E. McGruder Faris, 1957, vol. 1, no. 1,
p. 38.
Some Differences Between Federal and Virginia Taxation in
the Estate and Gift Tax Field. H. Brice Graves, 1957, vol. 1,
no. 1, p. 69.
Taxes Imposed by the Federal Government-Their Nature,
Rates, and Methods of Reporting and Payments. Thomas J.
Middleton, Jr., 1958, vol. 1, no. 2, p. 374.
Compensation from an Employment (Internal Revenue Code
of 1954, sec. 1301). R. Harvey Chappell, Jr., 1959, vol. 2,
no. 1, p. 3.
Taxes Imposed by the Virginia Code-Their Nature, Rates
and Methods of Reporting and Payments. Frederick P.
Aucamp et al., 1959, vol. 2, no. 1, p. 104.
Tax Effects of Divorce, Marital Separation and Support
Agreement. Lester 1. Bowman, 1960, vol. 2, no. 2, p. 297.
Short Term Trusts. J. W. Hornsby, 1960, vol. 2, no. 2, p. 311.
Observations on the Tax Immunity of Federal Properties and
Operations in Virginia. John M. Court, 1960, vol. 2, no. 2,
p. 460.
Taxation, Amount Received for Future Damages. John J.
Harrington, 1960, vol. 2, no. 2, p. 514.
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The Civil Aspects of the Net Worth Method. Richard D.
Schwab, 1961, vol. 3, no. 1, p. 65.
A Roadmap of Subchapter S. Robert S. Bersch, 1961, vol. 3,
no. 1, p. 99.
The Deductibility of Moving Expenses and Investigatory Ex-
penses. Bernard Goldstein, 1961, vol. 3, no. 1, p. 115.
The Real Estate Investment Trust: A New Medium for In-
vestors. A. Overton Durrett, 1961, vol. 3, no. 1, p. 140.
Federal Income Taxation: Meals and Lodging Furnished for
the Convenience of the Employer-Two Sequels to the Boy-
kin Case. Rexford R. Cherryman, 1961, vol. 3, no. 1, p. 166.
Some Problems Facing the Tax Court. Norman 0. Tietjens,
1962, vol. 3, no. 2, p. 453.
Collapsible Corporations: A Question of Intent. Douglas W.
Conner, 1962, vol. 3, no. 2, p. 483.
Tax Planning for the Hobby Enthusiast. Daniel U. Liver-
more, 1962, vol. 3, no. 2, p. 498.
§304 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954: Redemptions by
Related Corporations. Thomas D. Terry, 1962, vol. 3, no. 2,
p. 457.
Deductibility of Living Expenses as Medical Expenses. Ed-
mund L. Walton, Jr., 1962, vol. 3, no. 2, p. 511.
Tax Legislation Enacted by the 87th Congress-Analysis of
Principal Changes. Samuel R. McClurd, 1963, vol. 4, no. 1,
p. 40.
The Deductibility of Educational Expenses Under §162(a)
of the Internal Revenue Code. John J. Harrington, 1963,
vol. 4, no. 1, p. 55.
The New "Subpart F" Foreign Income Provisions of the
Internal Revenue Code. Rexford R. Cherryman, 1963, vol. 4,
no. 2, p. 172.
The Reconstruction of Net Income Under §446(b) of the
Internal Revenue Code, 1963, vol. 4, no. 2, p. 211.
TAXATION
WHY AN INTEREST EQUALIZATION TAX?
OWEN ALAN KNOPPING
CHATER I. Background
On July 18, 1963, the late President Kennedy presented, as
part of his "Balance of Payments" message to Congress, a tax
proposal which imposed a new excise tax on the acquisition of
foreign stock, securities, or obligations. Why, at a time when
the President and the Congress are debating future tax deduc-
tions, should a tax of the sort suggested be introduced?
Since 1950, the United States has experienced a deficit in
its balance of payments in each year except one.' In order to
understand the nature of the problem, "balance of payments"
will be defined as the flow of United States dollars resulting
from transactions entered into between Americans and other
peoples of the world. 2 The accountant would probably define
"balance of payments" in terms of a double entry-that for every
export the United States receives a corresponding payment, and
accompanying every import are corresponding payments to other
countries3
One likes to think of the United States as the wealthiest of
nations. Although this is, of course, true, it seems incredible that
a wealthy nation such as ours should be experiencing a balance
of payments problem at this time. Generally, it can be said
that that is the price to be paid for being the leader of the free
world.
Specifically, there are various reasons why we are involved in
this problem. First, it can be said, that there is needed among
the various nations of the world, not only the multual exchange
of products, but also reciprocal travel and investment.4 No one
nation is so self-sufficient that it can exist alone without trading
with other nations.5 This constitutes the very basis of the idea
1 Tax Foundation's Tax Review, July 1963, XXIV, No. 7, p. 28.
2 New York Times, July 21, 1963, Sec. IV, p. 1, col. 3.
3 Business Week, July 27, 1963, p. 58.
41d. at 56.
5 Ibid.
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of balance of payments. If trading was the only factor that had
to be considered, the US would not be faced with any payments
problem. Insofar as US exports and imports are concerned, which
historically presents the usual balance of payments problem, the
United States balance of payments has been favorable. 6
The problem goes much deeper. Since World War II, the
United States as a by-product of the Marshall Plan and subse-
quent military and economic assistance programs, has engaged in
continued aid programs, unprecedented in nature, involving
grants and loans totaling some $80 billion.7 Since our export
surpluses were not enough to cover the amounts spent, this un-
precedented expenditure of US dollars has resulted in large dollar
claims against us.8 Although much has been done to rebuild the
war-devasted nations, our role, as defender of freedom has re-
mained constant. The United States, unilaterally, and as a prin-
cipal partner in a strategic joint enterprise has undertaken the
major share of the costs of defense which have been necessary
to deter future communist aggression. Thus military and eco-
nomic aid to the other nations of the world is the principle
source of our deficits problem.
Along with this problem of military and economic aid, has
been the problem of short-term outflows to Canada and the
Eurodollar market, which has been accumulating at an annual
rate of $3.5 billion. 9 In addition, there has been a rising volume
of long-term foreign borrowing in the United States, which is
estimated at an annual rate of $2 billion. These two factors
contribute greatly to an already aggravated deficits problem.
Insofar as foreign borrowing in the United States is con-
cerned, there appears to be two primary reasons why the US
market is so appealing."' First, the United States offers lower
long-term interest rates than do the other financial centers; and
second, there exists a ready availability of capital in the United
6 Hearings before the Committee Ways and Means of the House of Repre-
sentatives, 88th Congress, 1st sess. on H.R. 8000, 165 1963 (hereinafter
cited as 1963 Hearings).
7 Ibid.
8 Ibid.
9 Business Week, July 27, 1963, p. 21.
10 1963 Hearings, p. 61.
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States. As a result, demand for US dollars has increased greatly
over the last few years, particularly the last few months. If this
increased demand is allowed to continue unchecked, the stability
of the dollar could be seriously undermined.' To make matters
worse, there is nothing to indicate that this wave on new issues
appearing on the US market, will of its own accord reduce in
volume.12
Besides this interest that exists among foreigners in acquiring
US dollars, there exists in the United States, a keen interest in
these foreign issues.13 The following are reasons for the recent
interest exhibited by Americans in foreign investments:
1) Higher interest rates in most foreign countries,
amounting to one-third more than interest rates obtainable
here;
2) Belief that foreign shares offer better profit growth
and dividend opportunity;
3) Certain foreign governments paying from 25-50
per cent higher interest rates than the US government pays;
4) Huge flow of savings in this country resulting from
the relative shortage of profitable investment outlets at
home. 14
Portfolio investment, in terms of long term loans and securi-
ties' purchases have been rising rapidly. Figures show that long-
term capital outflows, including both direct investment in pro-
ductive plant abroad and portfolio investment, have increased
from $850 million in 1960 to $1.2 billion in 1962 and for the
year 1963, appears to be running at an annual rate of well over
$1.5 billion with no sign of abatement in sight.15
Secretary of Commerce Hodges admits that it is our duty,
as a leading world power, to continue to supply urgently needed
capital through private market facilities.16 However, he feels
that, "it serves the interest of no free nation to have this flow
run at a pace that sharply aggravates existing imbalance in inter-
" Ibid.
12 Ibid.
13 1963 Hearings, p. 291.
14 1963 Hearings, p. 61.
Is 1963 Hearings, p. 5.
16 1963 Hearings, p. 62.
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national payments." 17 He emphasized that it is incumbent upon
the other highly industrialized countries to develop their own
capital facilities and thereby support their own rapid growth,
It is admitted that there is progress being made along these lines;
however, this progress has been agonizingly slow, and unless
temporary steps are taken, continued deficits will produce in-
tolerable strains on the monetary system as a whole as well as
imperiling future prospects of growing trade among nations.19
Consequently, it can be said that since 1950, the United
States by investment abroad and by its massive military and
economic aid programs, has expended many more dollars than it
has been able to accumulate." The following graph2 ' will illus-
trate the extent of the problem, by indicating that up until the
year 1950 the United States found itself in a favorable payments
position. However, since that date, as previously mentioned, a
deficit has been evident each year except 1957.
UNITED STATES BALANCE OF PAYMENTS
(ANNUAL RATE, BILLIONS OF DOLLARS)
*Revised figures
Revision removes non-recurring items such as for debt pre-
payments from an earlier method of cAlculating Balance of Pay-
ments, indicated by solid line below. Revisions not made prior to
1960.
What has this deficit problem meant in terms of our gold
supply? Due to the aid and investment that had gone abroad in
the late 1950's, foreign countries had accumulated large sur-
plusage of dollars, and requested that they be able to exchange
the dollars for gold. Since the United States possessed almost 60
per cent of the free world's supply of gold, this request was
graciously met at first.2 2 However, this request for gold has con-
tinued until the point has now been reached where our gold
supply has dwindled down to $15.7 billion as compared to the
$24.6 billion reserve which the United States had in 1949. Since
17 Ibid.
18 Ibid.
191d. at 63.
20 Business Week, July 27, 1963, p. 55.
21 New York Times, August 22, 1963, p. 37, col. 2.
22 Business Week, July 27, 1963, p. 56.
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$12 billion is needed to back the US currency, this leaves only
$4 billion in what is termed "free gold" which is needed to meet
foreign claims. At this time, potential claims amount to some
$25 billion, which makes for a very unhealthy situation.23
Since gold is the very backbone of our monetary system, it
is vital to our economic security that the price of gold be main-
tained at the present $35 per ounce. This price is necessary in
order to insure confidence in the US dollar. However, this price
becomes increasingly more difficult to maintain as the foreign
dollar balance increases.24
Therefore, there is no doubt that a very serious problem
exists. If for some unexpected reason all the foreign nations
holding US dollars decided to exchange their dollar holdings for
gold, one can imagine the catastrophic effects this would have,
not only insofar as our monetary system is concerned, but also
23 Tax Foundations Tax Review, July 1963, XXIV, No. 7, p. 28.
24 Ibid.
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with respect to the whole international monetary system. Con-
sequently, due to the immediate nature and seriousness of the
problem, it has become necessary for the President to take the
steps necessary to counteract the deficits problem.
It can be said that the United States has been keenly aware
of the problem prior to now. However, prior to the present
action, the United States maintained a policy of avoiding any
"direct" action on the deficits problem.2 5 In fact, government
policy centered upon (1) improving the competitive position of
the United States by means of wage-price restraints, tax-cuts,
and export promotion, and (2) a series of "palliatives" designed
to keep the outflow of gold minimized.2 6
Action to rectify the payments' problem as initiated in mid-
1960, prior to the late JFK's administration. In a move by the
Federal Reserve, a "floor" was placed under short-term interest
rates. Later, the aim was to maintain short-term interest while
long-term interest rates were being reduced.2 7 In early 1961,
the Treasury Department joined the Federal Reserve in a de-
termined effort to combat the gold outflow. At this time, the
Treasury tried to make investment more attractive in the United
States by adding steadily to the available supply of short-term
securities, and at the same time maintain a floor under the interest
rates, so as to minimize short-term capital outflow. 2 8 In March
1961, after the late President Kennedy's term of office had begun,
the Treasury entered the foreign exchange market. This was the
result of action taken by West Germany and Holland, both of
whom revalued their currency upward by five per cent. The
Treasury's aim was to dampen the speculative drain on dollars
before a point was reached where the United States would be
forced to sell goldY2 The Treasury joined with the European
Central banks in the fall of 1961 to keep the London gold market
under control. Their objective was to ward off any possible
major speculative rises in the gold market.30
25 Business Week, July 27, 1963, p. 60.
26 Ibid.
27 Ibid.
28 Ibid.
29 Ibid.
so Ibid.
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The extent to which the preceding measures were success-
ful in thwarting the continuing drain upon our gold supply
appears to have been negligible in the light of present conditions.
The late President Kennedy in his special "Balance of Payments"
message to Congress last July, did state that the balance of pay-
ments deficit had been reduced from $3.9 billion in 1960, to $2.4
billion in 1961 and to $2.2 billion in 1962.31 Much of this success
has been attributed to special arrangements which have been
made with some of our allies. These arrangements have included
early debt repayment as well as advanced payment for military
equipment and US borrowings abroad.3 2 Prepayment of foreign
debts alone, have reduced the payments deficit by nearly $700
million in 1961, and again in 1962.33 Also contributing to the
limited success of curtailing the outflow has been (1) the avail-
ability of US Treasury bonds for sale to foreign governments
denominated in foreign currencies; and (2) by means of non-
negotiable, non-interest bearing securities as payment of the
United States subscription to certain international organizations.34
However, in not trying to underestimate the effects of the
previous steps mentioned, the late President as well as his top
economic advisors believed that more immediate efforts were
necessary to curtail the present outflow of dollars.
First, the late President recognized the fact that the Nation's
over-all economic performance must be improved. In order to
accomplish this, a long-term domestic program must be initiated.
This would include increased investment, improved productivity,
and wage-price stability. These steps are designed to better the
US competitive position at home and abroad.35
Since it will take a while for these long-range plans to take
effect, these are areas in which, if immediate efforts are put
forth, much can be accomplished to reduce the deficit and at the
same time protect our gold reserve.36
31 CCH, Vol. 50, No. 41, August 10, 1963, p. 1.
32 Id. at 2.
33 Tax Foundation's Tax Review, July 1963, XXIV, No. 7, p. 28.
34 Ibid.
35 CCH, Vol. 50, No. 41, August 10, 1963, p. 3.
36 Ibid.
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Included among the areas mentioned in the President's speech
in which immediate strides could be made were: export expan-
sion; tourism; federal expenditures abroad; short-term capital
flows; investment by foreign savers in the securities of US private
companies; special government transactions; gold sales and in-
creased dollar holdings; the International Monetary Fund; and
finally, long-term capital flows.31 The President discussed each
of these areas in great detail, advancing ideas on how immediate
improvements could be made which would slow down the gold
outflow and at the same time improve our deficits situation.
The President, in his detailed discussion of each area, sug-
gested six immediate measures by which our export potential
could be developed more fully;38 encouraged a "See America
Now" program; presented means by which federal expenditures
abroad could be reduced, etc.
However, as part of his program to curtail long-term capital
outflows, the President suggested three possible solutions to this
problem of long-term capital outflows.39 The first would in-
crease the whole long-term interest rate, while the second called
for direct capital controls. The former suggestion would, how-
ever, probably throw the whole economy in reverse by causing
increased unemployment and by substantially reducing import
requirements. Direct capital controls, used by many countries, is
contrary to our basic concept of free markets.
The third solution suggestion by the President was in the
form of a tax proposal which he has urged the Congress to enact.40
President Kennedy had called it an "Interest Equalization Tax."
Generally, the tax would increase the cost to foreigners of obtain-
ing capital in this country by approximately one per cent. It is
hoped that the tax will have the effect of curtailing the flood of
foreign security offerings in the United States and at the same time
remain consistent insofar as economic growth and free capital
movements are concerned.41 The following chart will illustrate
the extent of private capital flows for the last four years, illus-
37 Id. at 4-13.
39 Id. at 4.
39 Id. at 7.
40 Ibid.
41 Ibid.
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trating the severity of the situation. For the last four years, there
has been a constant outflow in dollars, as a result of investment
abroad.
PRIVATE CAPITAL FLOWS IN THE US BALANCE OF PAYMENTS
1959 to First Quarter 1963
(In Millions of Dollars)
LONG TERM CAPITAL DIRECT IN-
VESTMENT:
US Direct Investment Abroad.
Foreign Direct Investment in
U S .........................
N ET ......................
PORTFOLIO INVESTMENT:
US Purchase of New Issues of
Foreign Securities ...........
US Net Purchase of Outstand-
ing Foreign Securities .......
Other US Long Term, Net .....
Redemption of US held For-
eign Securities ..............
Foreign Long Term Portfolio
Investment in US ...........
N ET ......................
NET LONG TEEM CAPITAL..
SHORT TERM CAmiAL:
US Short Term Net ...........
Foreign Commercial Credits to
U S .........................
NET SHORT TEEM CAITAL2 .
Unrecorded Transactions ..........
]st Q.
1959 1960 1961 1962 19631
-1372 -1694 -1598 -1557 -556
238 141 73 132 17
-1134 -1553 -1525 -1425 -539
-624 -573 -523 -1076 -512
-139 -177 -353 -55 -26
-258 -200 -258 -248 14
95 100 123 170 31
471 289 393 139 11
-455 -561 -618 -1070 -482
-1589 -2114 -2143 -2495 -1021
-77 -1348 -1541 -507 31
154 -90 177 -116 -13
+77 -1438 1-1364 -623 18
412 -683 -905 -1025 106
'Not seasonally adjusted.2Including receipts on Export-Import Bank findings of US private
Short-Term Credit-1961, 111; 1962, 93; 1st quarter, 1963, 8; Survey of
Current Business.
Unless something is suggested immediately, there exists the
possibility that the dollar will lose its status as the prime media of
international payment, as various types of restrictions are imposed
upon foreign transactions in the United States. In fact, there has
been a trend along these lines for some time.4 These restrictions
include: reduction of tourists' duty free imports from $500 to
$100; more and more US aid tied to purchases in this country;
42 Tax Foundation's Tax Review. July 1963, XXW, No. 7, p. 27.
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Americans prohibited from buying and holding gold overseas,
etc.
4 3
Therefore, the President, along with Secretary of Treasury
Dillon, l elieve that this "Interest Equalization Tax" would be a
step towards the predetermined goal of curtailing the payments
deficit. Mr. Dillon believes that the tax will have a two-fold
purpose. 4 1 First the tax will provide the means by which external
equilibrium may be restored by increasing the profitability of
investment in the United States and causing more effective capi-
tal markets abroad; and second, the tax will be instrumental in
reducing the gold outflow.
The ta:" will have a positive effect on the balance of pay-
ments, and yet will not impede access to American markets by
those foreigners unable to obtain longer term funds on reason-
able terms elsewhere. Market prices and decisions will continue
to determine the allocation of funds for investment in foreign
securities.45
The tax will, if correctly applied, raise the costs of acquir-
ing capital in the United States, so as to place them more in
line with the costs prevailing elsewhere. The end result, it is
hoped, will be to substantially eliminate any incentive to obtain
capital in the United States, where the purpose is simply to
achieve savings in cost. Therefore the Government feels that
long-term funds will remain available to those in a position to pay
the higher rate.4 6
What impact, if any, does the United States expect the tax
to have on curtailing future capital outflow? Trying to predict
the impact on capital outflow will certainly be an impossible
task, since you are dealing with market prices rather than admin-
istrative controls. Mr. Dillon believes future transactions of
the sort involved will depend upon the urgency of the needs
of other countries, the speed with which capital markets in other
43 Ibid.
44 1963 Hearings 58.
45CCH, Vol. 50, No. 41, August 10, 1963, p. 13.
46 1963 Hearings 64.
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countries are developed, and upon other supply and demand
factors existing at home.4 7
Mr. Dillon predicts that the tax will have the effect of re-
ducing investment for new bond and stock issues to the $500 to
$700 million range, a range prevailing from 1959-1961. Besides
aiding our deficits problem, the tax proposal should generate
anywhere from $20 to $30 million annually, in terms of revenue.48
The late President Kennedy's tax proposal came out at the
same time that the Federal Reserve was raising the discount rate
from 3 to 3 Y2 per cent and the ceiling rate permitted to be paid
by banks on time deposits. In conjunction with these moves,
the United States requested, and has been approved, a $500
million standby credit from the International Monetary Fund.49
The late President Kennedy believed that the new tax proposal
plus reduced government spending and including the above men-
tioned policy moves could have the effect of reducing the deficit
by some $2 billion over the next 18 months.50
CHAPTER II. Nature of the Tax
The late President Kennedy, as part of his effort to reduce
the balance of payments deficit, and at the same time defend our
gold reserve, suggested the immediate passage of what has been
termed an "Interest Equalization Tax." The proposed tax, desig-
nated H.R. 8000, was introduced by the Honorable Wilbur D.
Mills, of Arkansas, chairman, Committee of Ways and Means,
United States, House of Representatives, on behalf of the admin-
istration.'
The purpose of this chapter is to acquaint the reader with
the nature of the tax and how it will affect the US investor.
Then, without trying to get involved with a detailed analysis of
the tax itself, a general description of the proposed "Interest
47 Id. at 71.
48 Ibid.
49 Business Week, July 20, 1963, p.. 25.
50 New York Times, July 21, 1963, Sec. IV, p. 1, col. 3.
'Hearings before the Committee on Ways and Means of the House of
Representatives, 88th Cong., 1st sess., on H.R. 8000, 57, 1963 (Hereinafter
cited as 1963 Hearings).
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Equalization Tax" will be given. Most of the source material
used in this chapter has been derived from the official "Descrip-
tion of the Proposed Interest Equalization Tax," as released by
the Treasury Department.2
Recognizing the serious payments situation that the US has
been experiencing the last few years, and seeing that part of the
problem has been the direct result of the flood of foreign securi-
ties on the American market. The Administration believed the
enactment of H.R. 8000 would reinforce the existing effort being
made to correct the US balance of payments deficit. Just to
re-emphasize the wave of foreign securities being sold here,
the figures of foreign security sales to US investors will be re-
peated. Foreign security sales in the United States which aver-
aged about $600 million in the years from 1959-1961, have in-
creased to $1.1 billion in 1962, and for the first half of 1963, has
reached an annual rate of some $1.7 billion.3
Therefore, the proposed tax will impose a special temporary
tax on US persons, who purchase "stock, debt securities, or other
obligations of foreign issuers or depository receipts or other
evidence of interest in, or rights to acquire, such interests." The
tax is intended to remain in effect until the end of 1965.4 The
late President had said that the imposition of the tax in con-
junction with some other suggested policy measures will reduce
the deficit by some $2 billion over the next 18 months.5
The tax proposal will apply to all United States citizens,
residents, and corporations including organizations ordinarily
exempt from federal income taxes. 6 Those liable for the tax will
be all United States persons making taxable acquisitions.' Since
purchases by United States citizens from other United States
citizens do not affect the balance of payments, transactions of
this sort will be excluded from the tax.
8
2CCH, Vol. 50, No. 41, August 10, 1963, p. 13.
3 Ibid. at 13.
4Id. at 14.
5 New York Times, July 21, 1963, Sec. IV, p. 1, col. 3.6 CCH, supra note 2, at 13.
7t d. at 14.
s Ibid.
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The proposed tax will apply to both new and outstanding
issues, including "portfolio purchases of stock or debt securities
issued by foreign corporations, governments, or other persons,"
although it can be said that more than four-fifths of the outflow
from all portfolio transactions in foreign securities for the past
year has resulted from new debt issues.9 However, if outstanding
foreign debt issues were exempt from the tax, the US investor's
interest would turn to these issuis, and the effectiveness of the
tax would be greatly reduced. In contrast, transactions involving
outstanding foreign equities have far exceeded the flow of new
stock issues.10 Insofar as the tax is concerned, it makes no differ-
ence whether the tax purchase is consummated at home or
abroad.""
The tax proposal will not apply to direct investments made
by United States persons in overseas subsidiaries or affiliates.' 2
In order to constitute a direct investment, it must include "the
acquisition of debt or equity interest in a foreign corporation
by a United States person owning at least 10 per cent control
after the transaction is completed." This definition of "direct
investment" is based on the statutory test utilized by the 1962
Revenue Act.' 3 It is not necessary to apply the tax to this area
because questions of market position and long-range profitability
which are closely connected to decisions to undertake direct
investment, completely outweigh concern over interest rate
differentials. 14 However, it should be noted, that if foreign
corporations are formed purely for purposes of avoiding the tax,
United States citizens making direct investments under these
conditions, will be subject to the tax.' 5
Acquisitions of indebtedness payable on demand and those
having a maturity of less than three years will not be subject to
the tax.16 Since these transactions involve enormous volume and
at the same time constitute a vital "lubricant" for world com-
merce, any disadvantage which may result from not applying
9 1963 Hearings 66.10 Ibid.
11 CCH, supra note 2, at 14.
12 Ibid.
13 1963 Hearings 68.
14 Ibid.15 CCH, supra note 2, at 16.
16 Id. at 14.
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the tax to this source, and some do exist, is greatly subordinated
to those reasons given for excluding these short-term obligations
from the tax.' 7 Trade financing transactions will not, therefore,
be affected by the tax, to any measurable degree, because trans-
actions of this sort will ordinarily fall within the three year cate-
gory previously mentioned."'
Export-Import Bank financing and commercial bank loans
executed in the ordinary course of their banking business will
not be subject to the tax.19 It is felt that the majority of these
loans will not be subject to the tax, anyway, due to the three year
exemption. Furthermore, foreign loans from the above sources,
which are of a longer variety, are relatively small, volume-wise,
and in the majority of cases can be tied to specific United States
exports. 2
0
United States producers extending credit as part of their
export sales will not be subject to the tax proposal.21 There-
fore, if one considers this specific tax exclusion along with that
provided for Export-Import financing and for commercial bank
loans, it becomes apparent that the tax will have no effect what-
soever on the present ability of the United States to offer to their
foreign customers, the finest credit facilities existing today.22
Acquisitions of security offerings, issued by international
organizations of which the United States belongs, will not be
taxable. In addition, corporation issues and government issues
of certain countries who are considered to be less-developed will
also be excluded from the tax. In order to fall within this cate-
gory, corporations must have their principal activities located
in these less-developed countries, as regulated by section 955(c)
of the IRC.Y
Countries considered to be less-developed will be those de-
fined by Executive order of the President. At the present time,
17 1963 Hearings 67.
18 CCH, supra note 2, at 15.
19 Id. at 14.
20 1963 Hearings 67.
21 CCH, supra, note 2, at 14.
22 1963 Hearings 68.
23 CCH, supra note 2, at 14.
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the list of less-developed countries includes, "all Latin American
countries, African countries with the exception of South Africa,
Asian countries except for Japan and the Crown Colony of Hong
Kong, and to a few other nations outside the Sino-Soviet Bloc."
The purpose of this exclusion is to aid "those nations with
chronic capital shortages, urgent development needs, and limited
capability for foreign borrowing o~n normal commercial terms." 
24
If the tax, as applied to a particular country, will threaten
the stability of the international monetary system, the President
has within his discretion, the power to exclude from the tax, new
issues of that particular country 2 5 Presidential authority may be
exercised only when a highly unusual set of circumstances exist.
An example of this sort of situation would be a particular foreign
country, who as a result of the tax, would be forced to take
measures which, if enacted, would imperil not only the stability
of its own currency, but the international monetary system as a
whole.2 6 (It is interesting to note that this Presidential authority
has already been exercised with respect to Canada. This will be
discussed in Chapter III.)
The discussion above, represents the particular areas which
will and will not be subject to the tax. The tax proposal presents
the area to which the tax will apply, followed by the areas within
which an exclusion will apply.
The proposed tax will be collected by means of the filing
of returns. Returns must be filed on the last day of the calendar
month following each calendar quarter in which a United States
person consummates a purchase
m
The Treasury Department has already designed forms which
will indicate that the security involved has been purchased from
another United States person and therefore will be exempt from
the tax.28 Temporary form 3625 and form 2626 for nominees
have been devised for this purpose. Instructions on the above
mentioned forms state that the forms can only be executed by a
24 1963 Hearings 68.
25 CCH, supra note 2 at 14.
26 1963 Hearings 69.
27 CCH, supra note 2, at 15.
28 New York Times, July 22, 1963, p. 33, col. 4.
1964]
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 5:230
person who is either a United States citizen or resident during
the time of ownership or continuously since July 18, 1963, and
that it is imperative for the purchaser to secure this form or an
approved substitute from the seller in order to claim an exemption
from the tax.2 Temporary form 3650 and form 3651 for nomi-
nees are to be used only for those "sales of foreign securities
which are effected on a national securities exchange registered
with the Securities and Exchange Commission by a member or
member organization of such exchange." The same rules, insofar
as who may execute such a certificate and who must secure the
certificate which applied to forms 3625 and 3626, apply to forms
3650 and 3651 also. It appears that forms 3650 and 3651 need
only be used if a member of a national securities exchange reg-
istered with the SEC desires to make a regular sale of a foreign
security on such exchange, but hasn't secured from the seller
forms 3625 or 3626.3 "Substitute" forms, in order to be used,
must conform to the requirements of Revenue Procedure 61-31. 31
In conjunction with the creation of the temporary forms by
the Treasury Department, the New York Stock Exchange has
issued the following rules for transactions involving the purchase
of foreign securities.3 2 Primarily the selling broker is held re-
sponsible to determine the status of the seller. To accomplish this,
the broker can follow one of two alternatives. The broker can
either obtain a blanket certificate of American ownership for
the account, or else supply a certificate of American ownership
for each individual transaction. If it is determined that the seller
is a United States person, no problem exists, and the sale is
handled in the same manner as any other transaction. If, on the
other hand, the seller is a foreigner and the sale is subject to the
tax, the transaction is marked, "Buyer Subject to Equalization
Tax." In addition to the regular ticker symbol of the security
involved, the letter "F" is also noted on the ticker tape as part
of the notice of sale.33
Insofar, as the sale of the foreign security is stock, the tax
is based on the value of the security acquired, and is imposed at
29 US Treasury Department, IRS, Form 3625, 3626, August 1963.
30 US Treasury Department, IRS, Form 3650, August 1963.
31 Rev. Pro. 61-31, 1960 Cum. Bull. 1003.
32 1963 Hearings 440.
33 Ibid.
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the rate of 15 per cent. The rate of tax of debt securities ranges
from 2.75 per cent to 15 per cent and is figured from a period
beginning with the date of acquisition and ending at maturity.3
4
The following,35 illustrates the rate of the tax for debt securities
of a period including from 3 to 28 years:
At least 3
At least 3 /2
At least 4Y2
At least 5 /z
At least 6Y2
At least 71/2
At least 8'Y
At least 912
At least 10 Y2
At least 11
At least 13
At least 16
At least 18
At least 21!/2
At least 23Y
At least 26Y
At least 28Y
Maturity
years, but less than 3 /z
years, but less than 4
years, but less than 5 Y/
years, but less than 61/2
years, but less than 7 Y/
years, but less than 8 2
years, but less than 9 /2
years, but less than 10Y2
years, but less than 111/2
years, but less than 13 Y2
years, but less than 162
years, but less than 18 /2
years, but less than 21 Y/
years, but less than 23 /2
years, but less than 262
years, but less than 28 /
years or more
Generally, it can be said that the tax, if enacted, will apply
to acquisitions occurring after July 18, 1963, the date of the late
President's message.36 If the tax was not applied retroactively,
serious problems could result if the administration permitted
time to elapse before the tax became effective. Any appreciable
time allowed before the tax became effective would allow suffi-
cient time for a large volume of transactions, which would only
result in worsening the deficits problem.31
At the request of the New York Stock Exchange, acquisi-
tions effected on a national securities exchange on or before
August 16, 1963, will not be subject to the tax. The reason for
34 CCH, supra note 2, at 14.
35 Id. at 19.36 d. at 14.
37 1963 Hearings 70.
years
years
years
years
years
years
years
years
years
years
years
years
years
years
years
years
Tax Rate
2.75%
3.55
4.35
5.10
5.80
6.50
7.10
7.70
8.30
9.10
10.30
11.35
12.12
13.05
13.75
14.35
15.00
1964]
WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 5:230
this request was so that the Exchange could have a sufficient
amount of time to formulate procedures, etc., in order to expedite
the means by which acquisitions subject to the tax will be
handled.3s
In addition, transactions consummated within 60 days after
July 18, 1963, the date of the late "resident's message, and if the
security acquired was covered by a registration statement filed
with the Securities and Exchange Commission within 90 days
prior to the July 18th date, will be exempt from the tax.3 9
CHAPTER III. Foreign Reaction to the Tax
The "Interest Equalization Tax," as has been previously
mentioned, is a tax proposal suggested by the late President
Kennedy, as part of his special balance of payments message,
presented to Congress on July 18, 1963. Generally speaking, its
purpose and effect with which we are quite familiar by now-
its purpose being to reduce capital outflow and its effect being
to raise the costs of borrowing by foreigners in the United States
market.
The announcement of the tax proposal had repercussions all
over the free world. Some of the countries reacted xiolently, to
the proposed tax, fearing the worse, while others more or less
accepted it for what it stood for, and at the samc, time hoped
that it would never pass.
Canada and Japan appeared to be the most concerned of
all the countries that would be affected by the tax. This stands
to reason, as the following chart will illustrate, new Canadian
and Japanese securities had the greatest appeal of all foreign
issues floated in the United States.'
38 Id. at 439.
?9 CCH, supra note 2, at 14.
' Hearings before the Committee on Ways and Means of the House of
Representatives, 88th Cong., 1st sess. on H.R. 8000, 74, 1963, (Herein-
after cited as 1963 Hearings).
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TABLE 3
NEW ISSUES OF FOREIGN SECURITIES PURCHASED
BY US RESIDENTS, BY QUARTERS, 1962-1963
(first half)
(In Millions of Dollars)
-1962 1963 1963
1st Half
Total I II III IV Total I III Annual
Rate2
Canada ............. 237 10 112 41 294 457 368 293 1214
Western Europe .... 57 35 138 15 7 195 60 145 410
Japan ............... 61 11 17 48 25 101 47 45 184
Latin Amer. Repub.. 18 3 19 3 834 1024 12 .... 24
Other Developed
Countries ......... 43 5 5 5 5 60 .... 18 36
Other Less Devel-
oped Countries.... 95 5 5 5 5 77 25 18 86
International Insti-
tutions ............ 12 80 1 3 ..... 84 .................
Total New
Issues.... 12 80 312 133 461 1076 512 465 1954
'Preliminary.
2Not seasonally adjusted.
3Less than $500,000.41ncludes $75 000,000 issued by Inter-American Development Bank.5Not available.
SOURCE: Survey of Current Business-Department of Commerce.
From the chart, it is quite apparent that our neighbor to
the north would lose most of all, if the tax proposal were enacted.
The tax proposal, when announced, had an almost immediate
effect in Canada. The following day when the Montreal Stock
Exchange opened, it was greeted by a huge wave of selling. The
President of the Montreal and Canadian Stock Exchange an-
nounced that if passed, the tax would have a most serious effect
on the entire Canadian economy, including a sharp drop in prices.2
The tax would result in further devaluation of the Canadian
dollar. The Minister of Finance in a statement said that "while
France, Italy and Germany have accumulated dollar surpluses in
recent years, Canada has a deficit and does not raise any more
2 New York Times, July 19, 1963, p. 1, col. 7.
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capital in the United States than is necessary to pay debts to the
United States." 3
The Minister intimated that the tax was more directly aimed
at these Western European countries, and because of the pay-
ment deficit problem existing within Canada at the present time,
he hoped that some concessions could be granted to Canada.
It was announced that the Canadian annual deficit is running
at an annual rate of about $1,000,000. Another Canadian govern-
ment spokesman's reaction was that the application of the tax
was ironical because it would fall heaviest on Canada, although
as stated by Canada's Minister of Finance, it was designed to
correct the unfavorable balance of trade existing with various
Western European countries.4
Foreign Minister Gordon of Canada stated that the tax
would act as a brake on Canadian expansion. This would be so
because it would make it much more costly and difficult for
Canadian provinces and municipalities to borrow money in the
United States. Mr. Gordon went on further to say that the
tax would act to worsen Canada's already existing deficits' prob-
lem as well as seriously affecting the Canadian economy as a
whole.5
The Canadian Government had announced, about one month
prior to the President's message, measures to control United
States investment and lessen control of Canadian companies by
United States companies. The United States, in announcing the
proposed "Interest Equalization Tax" reassured Canada that the
tax was not intended as a reprisal against the earlier announced
Canadian policy.6
Less than two days after the tax was announced, "high-
level" US-Canadian talks were called for by Canadian government
officials. The primary purpose of these "high-level" talks by
Canadian officials was, of course, to seek relief from the tax.
3 New York Times, July 20, 1963, p. 30, col. 6.
4 New York Times, July 19, 1963, p. 1, col. 7.
5 Ibid.
6New York Times, July 21, 1963, p. 1, col. 5.
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Canadian officials stated that this heavy borrowing in the United
States was necessary to finance the heavy purchases in the United
States. American government officials estimated that 40 per cent
of dollar outflow went to Canada last year 7
The "high-level" talks brought some results insofar as the
present Canadian situation was concerned. If in retrospect, one
examines H.R. 8000 as written, it will be remembered that the
President has within his authority, discretion to exclude from the
tax new issues of securities from foreign countries, if in his
opinion, application of the tax would imperil or threaten to
imperil the stability of the international monetary system.8
Consequently, the late President announced that the tax
would not apply to new Canadian issues floated in the United
States.9 This exclusion came about four days after the tax pro-
posal was presented to Congress. The action resulted, not only
because of the serious fiscal problem existing in Canada, but also,
because two-thirds of the new issues floated on the New York
Stock Exchange were of Canadian origin, and both countries are
each other's best customers.1 o
The relief granted to Canada was to act as a two-way sword.
In returri- for the US concession to Canada, the latter promised to
aid the United States in its deficit fight. Canada promised to
reduce the long-term interest rates, which in turn would bring
the cost of borrowing in the US and Canada more in line with
one another, and thereby achieve the objective sought by the
tax.1
This added relief granted to Canada resulted in further
repercussions from other free world countries insofar as appli:-
cation of the tax was concerned. Although this will be developed
more fully in the next chapter, it can be generally stated that
reaction to this concession included opinion that the US was
retreating in its efforts to reduce the balance of payments and
7 Ibid.
8 CCH, Vol. 50, No. 41, August 10, 1963, p. 14 .
9 New York Times, July 22, 1963, p. 1, col. 6.
10 Ibid.
11 New York Times, July 24, 1963, p. 37, col. 6.
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that this further relief granted to Canada would defeat the very
purpose of the tax.
It appears, that next to Canada, Japan has more to lose than
any other nation who will be affected by the tax. "In the 4
years ended July 1963, the Japanese government has had two
issues of long-term bonds aggregating approximately $43 million,
and Japanese corporations have had over 30 issues of securities
(stock and/or long-term debt) aggregating approximately $390
million (including 6 issues aggregating $111 million for two gov-
ernmcnt guaranteed corporations)." 12 By mid-1963, over 20
Japanese corporations have been able to obtain long-term funds
in the United States by means of either private or public sale
of equity or debt securities. It is no wonder then that the
passage of such a tax could have nothing but far-reaching con-
sequences on the future financial planning and attitudes of all
Japanese corporations interested in obtaining money in our
market.13
Although activity on various foreign markets was some-
what moderate, declines ranging in the area of from 2 to 3 per
cent, heavy selling was reported in Tokyo.14 The Tokyo stock
market, in the two days following the late President's message,
declined 123 points. This drop, without parallel in Japan's
financial history, resulted in a loss in the aggregate of $1.8 billions
in security values. 15
Tokyo's violent reaction to the tax seems to stem from the
fact that the tax will have the effect of "restricting Japan's ability
to get long-term capital from the New York capital market
which is important in supporting Japan's balance of payments'
position.'6 The Japanese Foreign Minister said that the tax meas-
ure will have the effect of reducing the "flow of long-term funds
from the United States to Japan in the form of stocks, bonds,
and debentures issued by the Japanese Government and business
organizations." He also feared that reductions in United States
12 1963 Hearings 467.
13 Id. at 468.
14New York Times, July 19, 1963, p. 23, cols. 1-3.
15 1963 Hearings 473.
16 New York Times, July 20, 1963, p. 30, cols. 3, 6.
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overseas spendings would have serious effects on the Japanese
defense program.17
(Although I had planned to devote the entire next chapter to
public reaction at home, it appears that for purpose of con-
tinuity, it would be proper to insert reactions of both the
State of Hawaii and firms whose work is devoted to Japanese
securities.)
Although the State of Hawaii is the newest addition to the
United States, its distance from the US mainland makes it a
"foreign" country for many purposes, one of which is its relation-
ship to Japan.
First, the Honorable John A. Burns, Governor of the State
of Hawaii, believes that the tax, if enacted, would invite re-
taliatory measures by the Japanese, which would in the long
run frustrate Hawaiian efforts to expand efforts and promote
travel to its shores.'8
Because of its location and ideal climate, the Far East and
Japan represent a "goldmine" bolstering Hawaii's efforts to in-
duce tourism to its shores. If the provisions of the proposed tax
were imposed upon Japan, as is intended, it could very easily
retard the growth of Hawaii's tourist trade.19 In addition, the
effect of the tax may go so far as to hamper efforts to promote
more Hawaiian pineapple products in Japan °
It is estimated that Hawaiian investors own somewhere in
the neighborhood of $25 million worth of Japanese securities.2 '
However, at the same time, it should be made clear that United
States investment in Japan, including Hawaii's share, is only one
part of the story. In 1962 alone, foreign capital investment in the
United States totaled some $1 billion. On the other side, US
investors received, in the form of interest and dividends, some
$800 million, on their foreign security holdings. In addition to
these impressive figures, it should be noted that although US
171 Ibid.
18 1963 Hearings 416.
19 Id. at 371.
201d. at 416.
21 Ibid.
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investors acquired some $124 million worth of Japanese securi-
ties, Japanese businessmen purchased in the United States ma-
chinery worth in the neighborhood of $516 million.2 2
Governor Bums, in presenting these facts and figures, in-
timated that the proposed tax could very well result in conditions
which could increase rather than negate the present deficits
position.
Dr. James H. Shoemaker, Vice President of the Bank of
Hawaii, and representing various interested organizations in
Hawaii, stated that at the time a Japanese syndicate was very
interested in purchasing the Sheraton Hotel in Hawaii. The price
tag for this transaction was about $8 million, or one-third of the
total volume of Hawaiian investment in Japanese securities.2
Dr. Shoemaker, as did Hawaii's Governor, believed that par-
ticularly in the case of Hawaii, the tax could do more harm
than good. Dr. Shoemaker was quick to point out that the tax
had already caused a general tightening up throughout Japan.
This could very likely result in import restrictions, which again
could tend to impede any significant improvement in our pay-
ments problem.24
Of even greater significance to the United States are the
consequences which could occur, if the Japanese element sup-
porting trade with Red China were to win even more support,
because of the adverse effects that the tax might have on the
Japanese economy.25 This situation should be given careful con-
sideration by Government officials.
A statement by Governor Burns summarizes Hawaii's posi-
tion on the subject of the tax. He is convinced that the tax will,
"simply drive away the better credit risk borrowers who can
get their money elsewhere, leaving the market to the borrowers
who will pay anything for their money just so long as they get it."
The Japanese Federation of Securities' Dealers Associations
in a letter to the Chairman of the House Ways and Means Corn-
22 Ibid.
23 Id. at 371.
24 Id. at 373.
25 Ibid.
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mittee, stated its position on the tax.2 6 In his letter, he stated
that besides the effect of slowing down Japan's industrial growth,
the United States will find Japan reducing its imports in pro-
portion to the reduction in money available to the Japanese by
means of the US capital market. Here is evident a reprisal in
the form of a veiled threat. Governor Burns of Hawaii feared
just such a threat.
In a statement by Mr. Albert H. Gordon, a senior partner
of Kidder, Peabody & Co., Mr. Gordon stated that "when the
outflow of long term capital is viewed in its proper perspective,
as an asset creating and income earning expenditure, of American
dollars, it appears shortsighted indeed to inhibit so drastically
this segment of our payments outflow." 27 Mr. Gordon thinks
this is especially true in light of even larger outflows such as
tourist expenditures. Due to Japanese reliance on the United
States as a free capital market since the war, Mr. Gordon further
believes that the "disintegration of a fabric of relationship and
mutual confidence" built over the last 15 years- or so would be
a great loss to all concerned 8
Because Japan felt it would be as much effected by the tax
as Canada, Japanese officials immediately came to the United
States, requesting concessions similar to those received by Canada.
However, Japan's request for special treatment was denied. For
some reason, the United States felt that this discretionary author-
ity retained by the President would be exercised only if the tax
caused serious economic difficulties in Japan; and perhaps at the
present time, such economic difficulties as contemplated b y the
bill do not exist.29
From Europe, came mixed and varied reaction to the late
President's tax proposal.
There is evidence to indicate that the tax, although unen-
acted, has begun to have the effect intended. A British banker
reports that quite a number of European borrowings, which ordi-
narily would go to New York, are being discussed in London.
26 Id. at 473.
2' Id. at 469.
28 Id. at 468.
29 New York Times, August 3, 1963, p. 21, col. 1.
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In fact, it has been reported that a number of planned New
York borrowings have been cancelled in London and on the
Continent."° Good or bad, foreign markets are being utilized.
The late President Kennedy in his speech hoped that such re-
sults would occur as part of his program to improve our pay-
ments position.
Although it would seem that foreign markets would be
pleased by the present action, because it would mean more
business to them, reports indicate general discontentment with
the tax in its present form.
London financiers look upon the tax proposal with great
suspicion. Many of them feel that a decrease in the confidence
of US currency can be expected if the tax is enacted in its
present state. Private business interests in London believe pres-
ent US action indicates a weak dollar.3 ' London's financiers also
believe that the subsequent exemption to Canada and postpone-
ment of the effective date of the tax securities listed on the NY
Stock Exchange give evidence that the plan was hastily con-
ceived. 32 As some London observers put it, the tax leaves "more
gaps than a bikini." It is their opinion that the United States
could have acted more decisively on its payments problem. In
the long run, these same London observers believe that the
United States will have to resort to still tighter money and
higher interest rates.33
Trading it, Amsterdam fell sharply as a result of the an-
nouncement of the tax. Sales of such issues as Royal Dutch Shell
and Uniever which have been American favorites, came to a
standstill. However, the main reason for the effect on the market
in Amsterdam appears to stem from the uncertainty of what the
tax means, how effective it will be, and whether it will be enacted
at all.3 4
In Italy, private commercial and banking people were quite
critical of the tax plan. The tax proposal comes at a bad time
30 New York Times, September 9, 1963, p. 43, col. 1.
31 New York Times, July 25, 1963, p. 39, col. 7.
32 New York Times, July 31, 1963, p. 33, col. 4.
33 Newsweek, August 17, 1963, p. 89.
34 New York Times, September 20, 1963, p. 43, col. 1.
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because Italy, is also having its payments problems, and as a
result had intended to borrow heavily from the United States.
Many Italian observers feel that the tax will lessen existing confi-
dence in the dollar. Besides that, they feel the tax might very
well lead to exchange controls, instead of achieving its primary
goal-curtailing outflows of the dollar from the United States.35
Sweden appeared to be quite uneasy over the tax proposal
because the proposal runs contra to the current trend of liberaliza-
tion in the international economy. It also believes that the tax
runs contra to the US policy of free trade and capital movement.36
In summary, the "Interest Equalization Tax" worries Euro-
pean financial experts. In general, European financiers believe
that the tax is unworkable and that it will never pass in its present
form.37 Others believe the tax will downgrade New York as the
financial capital of the world.38
There are some who believe that the effects of the tax may
be avoided. An example of this would be a foreign government
bond to be sold in New York at a price of 100. The foreign
government in order to compensate for the tax would reduce the
price of the bond. Essentially, the tax would be paid by the
seller and not the buyer. European experts feel that if a Euro-
pean borrower is willing to borrow in the United States at the
rate of 5 /2 per cent, he would still be willing to borrow at 6 '
per cent 39 It also would be possible for a US investor to ship
dollars abroad, purchase the stocks there and deposit them at
some overseas address.40
Some European bankers, as well as some others are happy,
not because of the tax proposal, but because the United States is
making a determined effort to strengthen its balance of payments
position.4m
35 New York Times, July 25, 1963, p. 39, col. 7.
36 Ibid.
3 7 New York Times, August 18, 1963, Sec. III, p. 1, col. 1.
38 New York Times, July 19, 1963, p. 23, cols. 1-3.
39 New York Times, August 18, 1963, Sec. III, p. 1, col. 1.
40 New York Times, July 19, 1963, p. 23, cols. 1-3.
41 New York Times, July 25, 1963, p. 39, col. 7.
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In short, reaction in the major financial centers ranged from
great enthusiasm to concerned criticism. There are some who
are bewildered and confused by what the tax will mean, while
others hope that tax will never become law.
CHAPTER IV. Public Reaction at Home
Reaction to the news of the proposed "Interest Equalization
Tax" was immediate, and as had occurred on foreign stock ex-
changes, the New York Stock Exchange witnessed a sharp de-
cline on the price of foreign securities traded through the
exchange.' Although foreign security sales came to a halt,
Americans continued to acquire outstanding foreign securities
from other Americans, since these transactions would not be
subject to the tax.2 Although a probable coincidence, it was
announced that as of July 19th, gold reserves had reached their
lowest point since April 19, 1939-$15,663,000,000.3
The newspapers were quite critical of the tax proposal. The
"Detroit Free Press" stated that the effect of the tax would be
inconsequential. A man who is earning from 10-15 per cent on
foreign securities was not going to be stopped by a two per
cent excise tax.4
The "New York Times" was quick to state that the tax was
ill-advised and hastily proposed.5 Evidence of this was the special
treatment that Canada received just after the tax was announced.
In fact, this special consideration given to Canada, largest of all
foreign borrowers, will lessen much of the plan's potential effect
on the payments problem. The "Times" stated that the tax
would have the effect of creating a two price system for long-
term capital markets,8 and it is their belief that the tax amounted
to a form of "control." 7 As far as the "Times" is concerned,
foreign borrowers are drawn to our shores, not because of the
42 Ibid.
1 New York Times, July 19, 1963, p. 1, col. 6.
2 N.Y. Times, July 20, 1963, p. 23, cols. 1-3.
3 N.Y. Times, July 19, 1963, p. 1, col. 8.
4 N.Y. Times, July 21, 1963, p. 9, col. 5.
5 N.Y. Times, July 24, 1963, p. 30, col. 2.
6 Ibid.
7 N.Y. Times, September 1, 1963, Sec. IV, p. 8, col. 2.
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low cost of capital, but primarily for the reason that there is
always a ready availability of funds.8
There is a small minority who view the tax proposal as
regrettable, but feel that it is about time that the United States
exert some effort in solving the payments problem, or at least,
reduce the outflow of gold to a point where it is considered safe.9
As soon as the tax was announced, leading foreign security
dealers got together to draw up counterproposals. Although it
was not clear as to what these proposals would involve, it was
felt that the dealers would ask that only new issues of foreign
securities be taxed. Their logic is that the balance of payments
is not penalized when a US investor switches from one outstand-
ing foreign security to another. The dealers also criticized the
15 per cent tax on outstanding foreign securities. In their opinion,
the outflow of dollars resulting from such purchases is insignifi-
cant when compared to the outflow resulting from the acquisi-
tion of bonds.10
Many observers feel that it is impossible to measure the
effects that the new tax proposal will have on the payments
problem. Since the area involved is quite delicate and very com-
plex, the risk that is being taken cannot be underestimated."
On Friday, August 16th, the New York Stock Exchange
experienced the heaviest trading in foreign bonds, and which has
been estimated to have been the largest ever. Of the $3,420,000,-
000 of foreign bonds traded on that day, at least $1,400,00,000
was of Japanese origin. The buyers, realized that if the tax was
enacted, it would be applied retroactively, with August 16th as
the cut-off date, and therefore tried to get in "under the wire." 12
One of the biggest .fears confronting the New York Stock
Exchange is that the tax, if enacted, could possibly weaken New
York's position as the financial capital of the world.' 3 Many
8 Ibid.
9 N.Y. Times, July 28, 1963, Sec. III, p. 1, col. 1.
10 N.Y. Times, July 22, 1963, p. 37, col. 1.
11 N.Y. Times, July 22, 1963, p. 33, col. 7.
12 N.Y. Times, August 17, 1963, p. 25, col. 7.
13 N.Y. Times, August 24, 1963, p. 23, col. 5.
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others expressed similar concern, with regard to New York and
the United States losing its position as the financial center of the
free world. In a statement by Mr. Mark E. Richardson, Execu-
tive Vice President of the New York Chamber of Commerce,
he said that "any substantial transfer of financial transactions to
foreign money centers, as would certainly occur from the imposi-
tion of the tax in question, would have an immediate and damag-
ing effect on New York's economy and employment." He went
on to say that the business and jobs which would be lost, could
in no way be compensated for, and that these losses, would in
the long run be detrimental to the United States.
1 4
The public received its opportunity to express opinion on
H.R. 8000, at the scheduled public hearings of the House Ways
and Means Committee. Much of the following material, which
summarizes public reaction to the proposed tax, comes from the
reported Hearings on H.R. 8000, before the Committee on Ways
and Means of the House of Representatives, held August 20, 21,
22 and 23, 1963.15
The Hearings Report totals 540 pages. Of all the persons
who had the privilege of testifying before the Committee, only a
handful actually favored the tax without any changes. In fact,
it can be said that very few people favored the tax at all.
Among those favoring the proposed tax were the Honorable
Franklin D. Roosevelt, Jr., Acting Secretary of the Department
of Commerce; the Honorable George W. Ball, Under-Secretary
of the Department of State; and the Honorable C. Douglas Dillon,
Secretary, Department of the Treasury. In addition to above
mentioned government officials who favored the new tax, in
their reports to the Ways and Means Committee, it appears
that of all the public witnesses testifying, only Mr. Nathaniel
Goldfinger, of the Department of Research of the AFL-CIO,
favored the tax.
Mr. Roosevelt restricted his comments on the tax, to the
subject of exports. He believes that since the tax does not apply
14 Hearings before the Committee on Ways and Means of the House of
Representatives, 88th Cong., 1st sess. on H.R. 8000, 159, 1963 (Here-
inafter cited as 1963 Hearings).
15 lId. at 134.
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to credits of less than 3 years, and since certain other exclusions
are allowed, if the transaction is directly related to exports, the
tax will not have a substantial effect on US exports. Although
recognizing that a small number of non-manufacturing exporters
might be required to alter their present financing arrangements,
he believes that in the long run, such alterations, if they become
necessary, are inconsequential as compared to the savings expected
to result from the tax.16
Many of the public witnesses who testified before the Com-
mittee, had opinions that were opposed to those expressed by
Mr. Roosevelt. The United States Council of the International
Chamber of Commerce, in a statement to the Committee, warned
of the detrimental effects that the tax might encourage, with
respect to our international trade, as well as to our relations with
other nations. The tax could go so far as to "handicap United
States business operations abroad, so that the long-run result
would be to reduce the sale of US goods and services in foreign
markets and reduce the flow of dividend and interest receipts
on foreign investments-thus worsening our balance of payments
position." 17 As a word of warning, the council emphasized the
fact that we have been enjoying a surplus in the all-important
balance of trade category, and therefore the government must
be careful not to do anything which might "tip the scale" the
other way, in the form of reduced sales of American goods and
services abroad.' 8 Another observer stated that many of our
exports are purchased with dollars obtained by means of security
sales on the US market, and as such, exports will probably be
reduced in direct proportion to the amount of reduction in
our foreign investment. 19
Under-Secretary Ball considered the tax proposal as an inte-
gral part of the President's program to curtail the payment's
deficit. He emphasized the importance of that section of the
bill which gives the President authority to exclude from the tax
new security issues, in those cases where extreme hardship exists.
This section of the bill is necessary, not only for purposes of
preserving the stability of the international monetary system, but
16 Ibid.
17 Id. at 409.
is Ibid.
19 Newsweek, October 28, 1963, p. 84.
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is also necessary in order to protect and maintain foreign policy
objectives of the United States.20
Secretary Dillon also supported the bill with great enthus-
iasm, and much of what he said in support thereof can be found
in Chapter 1.21
From the labor standpoint, the AFL-CIO came out in favor
of the bill. As head of the Department of Research for the
AFL-CIO, Mr. Nathaniel Goldfinger, stated that although he
realized a balance of payments problem exists, it is greatly over-
exaggerated. He attributes the payments' difficulty to the failure
of the United States to sustain full-employment and maximum
utilization of its productive capacity. Being, of course, pro labor,
Mr. Goldfinger believes that the solution to the payments' prob-
lem rests with three factors: rapid, growing full employment at
home; increased international confidence in the dollar; and in-
creased opportunities for profitable investment at home. Al-
though a long run solution is necessary, the "Interest Equaliza-
tion Tax" represents a step in the right direction.22
Before stating further reaction to the tax at home, it is
of interest to note that although unenacted, the "Interest Equali-
zation Tax" appears to be attaining much success. Reports indi-
cate that since the late President Kennedy's message on July 19th,
trading in existing securities have declined drastically, while no
new foreign securities have been issued. For all intensive pur-
poses, both of these conditions have halted the outflow of
capital.23
Another published report gives credit to both the rise in
short-term interest rates and to the new tax proposal for main-
taining US gold stocks at a steady figure for a period of five
weeks, ending in mid-September.
24
Mr. Mark E. Richardson, a representative of the New York
Chamber of Commerce, stated that the whole international
20 1963 Hearings 156.
21 ld. at 58.
22 Id. at 421.
23 N.Y. Times, September 23, 1963, p. 43, coL 6.
24 N.Y. Times, September 20, 1963, p. 43, col. 2.
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monetary operation today depends almost wholly on the United
States dollar, and on the complete and high regard that the rest
of the free world has in its integrity as a means of international
exchange.25 Many others expressed similar opinions, and feared
that the proposed tax would strike a strategic blow at the reputa-
tion of the strongest currency in the world.26 The enactment by
Congress of such a tax might lead Americans and foreigners alike,
into believing that the dollar is weak, and thereby undermining
confidence in it.27
Statistics seem to bear out the fact that investment abroad
has been averaging at an annual rate of approximately $1.9 bil-
lion. Of this amount, $1.3 billion consists of exempt moneys,
while some $400 million is of Japanese origin, and which will
still be placed on the US market, in spite of the tax. Therefore
imposing a tax, which would effect a small portion of the total is
hardly worth the risk, when one considers the consequences of
having doubt thrown on the integrity of the dollar.28
The Chairman of the International Investment Division of the
Investor's League, Inc., believes that the gold reserve is not quite
in the condition that reports make it out to be. He feels that no
matter how hard we try to control our gold reserves, a con-
tinuing pressure, resulting from continued leaps in standards of
living and trade, will exert a continuing pull on our gold reserves.
The problem lies in the fact that the United States lags in its
rate of industrial production as compared to some of the more
highly industrialized nations, thereby resulting in no flow of
foreign funds seeking diversification here.29
To some, the proposed tax, if enacted, would contradict
previous State Department policy encouraging private invest-
ment and trade with other nations&0 The United States, having
for all substantial purposes, become world banker, has been in-
strumental in raising capital for other free countries. The tax,
as such, appears to be inconsistent with our long standing policy
25 1963 Hearings 157.
26 Id. at 177.
27 Id. at 288.
28 Id. at 158.
29 Id. at 176.
30 ld. at 182.
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of free capital movements, and thus to many observers, involves
grave consequences which far outweigh the little benefit which
might be derived from it. The overall international assets posi-
tion of the United States as well as its balance of payments
position for future years is greatly enhanced when one considers
the expected return of interest, dividends and capital.3 '
Mr. I. W. Burnham, representing the Wall Street brokerage
firm of Burnham & Co., believes that the proposed bill is in-
equitable and discriminatory. First, H.R. 8000 discriminates in
favor of the large investor. While the small investor, who buys
a few shares of stock and bonds is subject to the tax, the large
company, by acquiring 10 per cent or more of the voting stock
of the same foreign corporation that the small man has invested
in, escapes tax free. In addition, the bill seems to tax equities at
a higher rate than are debt securities. Mr. Burnham feels that this
is inconsistent, since debt securities constitute the principal form
of new issues. Since trading is a two-way affair, the tax could
very well have the effect of curtailing purchases by foreigners of
our securities.3 2
Other testimony presented to the Committee indicated that,
if enacted, the tax proposal would create two different markets,
one among Americans and another for overseas transactions.
Americans unable to purchase certain foreign securities at home
from other Americans, will as a consequence, have to pay the 15
per cent tax, and acquire the security from an overseas source.
Although such a situation was never intended, the tax is certain
to have these results, if passed.33
The International Economic Policy Association was repre-
sented by its President, Dr. N. R. Danielian. Dr. Danielian be-
lieves that the private flow of capital is a symptom rather than
the cause of the deficits' problem. When one considers the
enormous amount spent by the United States for foreign defense
and aid, it is not possible for the surplus created by US commer-
cial sales to offset these expenditures. As long as the United
States is faced with this burden, which in the final analysis is
31 Id. at 219.
32 Id. at 254.
33 Id. at 294.
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the ultimate cause of the problem, capital will continue to flow
at this unprecedented pace. If this burden could be eliminated,
then private capital outflows, which are self-sustaining, would
be inconsequential 34
Timmons & Co., a brokerage firm engaged in buying and
selling foreign securities, especially Canadian issues, objects to
passage of the bill because, in addition to some of the criticism
expressed by others, relating to the bill's discriminatory features, 5
the legislation imposes a tax regardless of whether a dollar out-
flow is involved or not. Many observers feel that although new
issues should be subject to the tax, outstanding issues should be
excluded. In allowing a US person to sell the foreign security
he presently owns, for another outstanding foreign security, no
dollar outflow is involved, unless additional cash is necessary for
the purchase.3 6
Insurance companies believe that the tax will have a sub-
stantial bearing on their ability to carry on the life insurance
business abroad. If one tries to understand the operation of insur-
ance companies overseas, the impact of the tax on their business
becomes apparent. These companies must take the premium col-
lections and invest them in that particular country, because at
death, the claims will eventually have to be paid in the currency
of that country. Besides the exchange risk involved, if the
premiums collected were sent to the US for investment and later
returned to the country in order to satisfy insurance claims, it
seems quite inconceivable that the people of the country would
appreciate their life savings being taken from the country, when
the savings are necessary to sustain economic growth there.37
In a position similar to that of the insurance companies, the
construction business opposed the bill because a "tax would be
imposed upon payment received from foreign countries when-
ever the client does not make an immediate full cash payment."
The construction business believes that the tax will place them
in a very disadvantageous position. It is their opinion that con-
34 d. at 323.
35 Id. at 254.
6Id. at 353, 425.
37M. at 355.
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struction jobs overseas represents eventual payments to counter-
act the deficit, although full payment may not be immediate. 38
Mr. Peter D. Seghers, the President and Founder of the
Institute of United States Taxation, stated that reliable statistics
indicate that reduction in foreign investment, because of the tax
and its application, will amount to only $250 million annually, as
opposed to the $500 million figure estimated by the Government.
Because of the various complexities of the tax, its exemptions and
arbitrary power which is retained by the President, Mr. Seghers
feels that corrective measures in the form of more competent
disbursements for aid and defense might provide a better solu-
tion to the problem. In addition, the Government should not
forget to give careful consideration to the effect that the bill
might have on the "most favored nation" clause of our treaties
of friendship and commerce which we have with other nations
of the world.-
The United States Chamber of Commerce opposes the tax
on the grounds that it is "inconsistent with the objective of
reducing, rather than increasing barriers to free international
movement of goods and capital." Overlooking the fact that the
tax probably will not have too much effect on improving our
payments position, the Chamber of Commerce pointed out that
over the past 30 years, the United States has relaxed its own
trade barriers and at the same time has encouraged other nations
to do likewise.40
Since commercial banks are permitted to make loans of in-
determinate maturity as long as the loans are in the "normal
course of business," there are those who believe that this pro-
vides an easy means of escape for potential borrowers. All the
foreign borrower has to do is shift to commercial bank loans, and
thus, in essence, the bank exemption becomes self-defeating. 41
As brought out by one of the critics of the bill, after you
take into account the exclusions which have been allowed to
38 Id. at 363.
391d. at 401.
40 ld. at 423.
41 Id. at 470.
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"Canada, the World Bank, the Inter American Development Bank,
the less-developed countries, bank loans, obligations of under
three years maturity," the tax can have only but so much effect
on curtailing the dollar outflow. To make matters worse, of all
the new securities floated on the American market, 62 per cent
of the volume were of Canadian origin.42 Evidence of what is
left after all of these exclusions are allowed can be set forth in
terms of figures, for the year 1962. In that year, foreign security
sales of new securities amounted to $1,076 millions. This figure
is net of the $221 million of these issues written here, but sold
abroad. If we exclude first, the exempt securities of international
institutions which total $84 million plus the $102 million worth
of securities from exempt Latin-American countries, we are left
with a net balance of new securities, totaling $890 million, which
would be subject to the proposed tax. Of this amount, there is
left Canadian issues accounting for $457 million and Japanese
securities totaling $101 million. Forgetting whether or not the
whole $457 million of new Canadian issues will be exempted
from the tax, it seems unlikely that there will be any significant
reduction in Canadian and Japanese sales of new issues on the
American market. The reasons for this include, an anticipated
reduction in United States exports if the tax is enacted, and the
fact that many will borrow here, tax or no tax. Therefore, after
all these calculations, only the $195 million balance resulting
from new issues of European securities, might possibly affect the
deficit, assuming the tax is effective and deters Europeans from
borrowing here.43
Not to be forgotten in analyzing H.R. 8000 is the advantage
that the Communists might receive from the proposed tax. Lest
we forget that American enterprise abroad has done much to
bolster our defense economically against Communist aggression.
Included in the category of American enterprise abroad is the
private investor. If we impede the private investor's ambitions
overseas, the end result could very well be increased outlays by
the government in the form of more aid overseas. In the long
run, this could have a more drastic effect on the payments situa-
tion, because it takes $2 of foreign aid to equal the effect of $1
business dollar. Of noted importance also, is the effect that the
42 Id. at 484.
43 1d. at 222.
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tax has had on the Latin-American under-developed countries,
whose securities are tax exempt from the bill. Reports indicate
that trading has come to a halt on quite a few securities which
originate from the above countries, because, with the powerful
discretionary authority granted the President, these so-called tax
exempt securities could become subject to the bill eventually.44
Criticism of the proposed bill appeared to be an "endless
stream," and it was possible to include a wealth of other material,
representing the reaction of still other witnesses who testified
before the Committee. However, much of what was said by these
witnesses was repetitious in nature, and merely affirmed the posi-
tion taken by the majority of those who reacted to the tax
proposal. However, from what has been given, one can visualize
and understand the various viewpoints expressed, with respect to
H.R. 8000. Almost!!
CHAPTER V. Alternatives to the Tax
After discussing overseas reaction to H.R. 8000 and the re-
action received at home, as reflected in newspapers and at the
Hearings, it was quite apparent that the majority of those voicing
an opinion of the bill, were opposed to it, in one way or another.
However, the above mentioned critics did realize the nature of
the payments problem as well as the serious ramifications related
to it. Opinion was not given just for the sake of the record.
Many of those who voiced opinion and at the same time recog-
nized the unprecedented difficulties which the United States
balance of payments has created, offered invaluable alternatives
to the tax. These observers believe that if the suggested alterna-
tives are followed the deficit could be reduced substantially, and
thus, there would be no need for the imposition of an "Interest
Equalization Tax". This chapter deals with these alternatives.
First, as has been mentioned in Chapter I, current steps are
being taken and are being enforced as part of the over-all pro-
gram to cope with the payments problem. The late President
in his Special Balance of Payments message to Congress, sug-
gested various areas in which immediate efforts would be made
to reduce the deficit and at the same time protect our gold re-
44 Id. at 181.
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serves. Among the areas mentioned were export; tourism; federal
expenditures abroad, etc.1
Most observers agreed with the President, that of primary
importance, would be intensive programs to expand exports,
realizing, of course, that exports could not do the job alone.2
"The long range and fundamental solution to our balance of
payments problem will depend on our ability to increase earnings
abroad through an expansion of exports of goods and services,
and income on foreign investment, to such magnitude as will
generate a favorable Balance of Payment in the private sector
sufficient in size to cover our foreign expenditures under govern-
ment programs." 3 This quote is taken from the Committee on
Finance and Currency of the New York Chamber of Commerce,
in a report examining the US deficit problem, and seems to ex-
press the over-all opinion with respect to using exports as an
instrumentality to reduce the deficit.
In connection with the discussion of exports, the New York
Chamber of Commerce in a different report, suggested that the
US dollars created abroad by United States agencies be reduced
where these expenditures are not connected directly to US ex-
ports. In addition, the Administration planned to save about $1
billion annually by reducing the number of military personnel
overseas, especially the dependents of those stationed abroad.
Also emphasized was the purchase of US goods and services,
while acquisitions of foreign goods and services were being de-
emphasized. 4
In concluding its position on possible suggestions to com-
pensate for the dollar outflow, the New York Chamber of Com-
merce advocated policies which would promote confidence in
the US economy, both here and abroad. Included among these
policies were reduced taxes for both individuals and corporations
and rigorous control of government expenditures, both domes-
tic and foreign. The former policy it is hoped will create vigorous
1 Hearings before the Committee on Ways and Means of the House of
Representatives, 88th Cong, 1st sess. on H.R. 8000, 4, 1963. (Herein-
after cited as 1963 Hearings.)2 1d. at 167.
3 Id. at 171.
4 Id. at 167.
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incentives to invest at home, while the latter is intended to achieve
a balanced budget and insure stability of the dollar.5
The Honorable Thomas B. Curtis analyzed the United States
Balance of Payments problem in a recent article on the subject.
Besides believing that a complete review of our foreign economic
and military programs was necessary, Mr. Curtis suggested that
immediate efforts should be put forth to equalize existing com-
petitive conditions between US exporters and those of other in-
dustrial nations. These efforts should include a better return on
invested capital; federal fiscal policy efforts to maintain a stable
price line; and policies to increase the productivity of American
industry, including lower prices, especially for manufactured
goods. In conjunction with these policies, Mr. Curtis also ad-
vocated removing the guaranteed price of gold at $35 per ounce
or any other pre-determined price. This would add an element
of risk to those desiring to hold gold.6
An editorial by the "New York Times" suggested that the
"best way to promote the free flow of capital' is to enhance the
attractiveness of American securities, and not by putting up bar-
iers on foreign investment." The "Times" believes that no im-
mediate dollar crisis exists, and that none need exist, if the
President would concentrate on his original tax reform and for-
get the present tax proposal, especially in view of its disruptive
effect on the United States economy and by the psychological
effects which it has created.7
Another alternative to the tax can be found in the testimony
presented by Dr. N.R. Danielian, President of the International
Economic Policy Association. It is his belief that the United
States should not carry as heavy a load as it has in defending the
free world from Communist aggression. "The solution must be
found in top level political agreement among the leaders of the
free world, including a definition of mutual obligations of the
parties, as to budgetary as well as foreign exchange costs, not
only in defense of Europe, but also in the containment of Com-
munist China in the Far East." Dr. Danielian believes that if this
5 Id. at 163.
6 Tax Foundation's Tax Review, July 1963, XXIV, No. 7, p. 28.
7 New York Times, July 31, 1963, p. 28, col. 1.
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burden is eliminated from the international payments system,
then dollar outflows created by US foreign investment would
be insignificant when it is realized that it is practically self-sus-
taining.8 In addition the Dr. has advocated a "lend lease program"
instead of the present foreign aid set-up, as a means of supplying
credit to our foreign neighbors.9
The President of the First National City Bank of New York,
Mr. George S. Moore, suggested "non-inflationary financing of
Treasury deficits" as an alternative to the tax proposal. Recog-
nizing the theoretical appeal created by such a tax, he does not
believe it will solve the payments difficulty, because of the prac-
tical problems presented and the necessary exemptions which
curtail its effectiveness. As part of his suggestion, Mr. Moore
has recommended another small increase in the Federal Reserve
discount rate as well as by another cut in required bank reserves.
In addition, a moratorium on existing and on proposed Federal
spending programs should be imposed until a time when United
States economic growth can bring our budgets into balance.' 0
A number of those echoing criticism of H.R. 8000 sug-
gested the creation of a "capital issues committee", a device well
known and trusted by Europeans. This committee would con-
sist of representatives from the Treasury Department, the Federal
Reserve Board, and the investment banking community at large.
It would be the committee's responsibility to investigate new
foreign issues on the basis of their anticipated drain on payments,
and thereby the committee would use its judgment in limiting
the number and the amount of foreign issues, as long as the
emergency exists."
One of the above critics was William C. Cates, Secretary of
International Investments Analysts of New York, an organiza-
tion consisting of individuals associated with various financial
institutions and who are concerned with analyzing stocks of in-
ternational companies. Therefore, in addition to the adoption of
a "Capital Issues Committee", Mr. Cates, in testimony presented
before the House Ways and Means Committee, suggested various
s 1963 Hearings 324.
9Id. at 335.
10 N.Y. Times, September 17, 1963, p. 45, col. 4.
111963 Hearings 295.
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other likely alternatives. One alternative which would be instru-
mental in bringing back dollars fast would be a two year tax
moratorium on repatriated earnings of United States corporations.
Also to be considered are tax incentives to foreign holders of US
securitie3 as well as a tax on United States citizens traveling
abroad. The former suggestion could include the removal of
withholding and inheritance tax liabilities on these US securities.
As for t le latter suggestion, Mr. Cates believes that travel is in
a category similar to fur coats or night clubs, etc., and such a
tax on travel could be administered quite easily. All that would
be necessary is that those traveling abroad report the number of
months that they have been out of the country, and then the tax
could be applied monthly.12
Anoth,;r alternative to the tax which has been suggested
is that the Administration try, by voluntary means, to curtail the
dollar outflow, created to some degree by the American purchase
of foreign securities. Under this alternative, it would be neces-
sary for the Government to obtain by means of a pledge or
gentleman's agreement from the various large institutional in-
vestors, a promise to refrain from acquiring foreign securities for
such a period of time as the emergency may exist. It is estimated
that if approximately 15 of the largest institutional investors
agreed to such a plan, the deficit could be reduced from $500,-
000,000 to $300,000,000 annually.'3 In conjunction with this
suggestion, requesting voluntary assistance as a means of curtail-
ing the deficit, one observer recommended that the United States
attempt to persuade foreign governments to take it upon them-
selves voluntarily to regulate the volume of securities that they
and their citizens would be allowed to sell here. Under this
alternative, the Administration would place a ceiling on the
volume of new foreign securities which would be allowed to be
sold here during a stated period of time.14
With all the criticism that has already been expressed with
regard to the proposed "Interest Equalization Tax", there are
some who believe that the bill might still have a chance of being
passed into law. Although these critics maintain their position
12 1963 Hearings, 295.
13 N.Y. Times, August 22, 1963, p. 37, col. 1.
14 N.Y. Times, August 23, 1963, p. 31, col. 4.
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in believing that the tax proposal is not the solution to the prob-
lem, they have recommended various changes to the present bill,
so that if enacted, it will be more equitable to all concerned.
Of primary concern to most of the critics of the bill is the
fear that if enacted, the tax could result in reprisals by other
foreign countries, in terms of reduced purchases of American
goods and services. As previously noted, the proceeds of many
of the foreign security sales made in this country, have been
used to purchase American goods and services. 15 In 1959, KLM,
Royal Dutch Airlines offered and sold $18,500,000 of 4% per
cent convertible subordinate debentures to United States persons,
the proceeds of which were used to acquire jet aircraft from US
manufacturers. Another transaction in 1959 was the sale of $10
million of sinking fund dollar debentures (together with war-
rants to purchase capital stock) by an Italian Chemical Firm,
Montecitine. Here, the proceeds were needed to finance the
construction of a chemical plant near Huntington, West Vir-
ginia. 16
Therefore, fearing that transactions similar to the above,
might be halted, if such a tax was enacted, and it has been sug-
gested that stock, debt obligations, or other securities acquired
in connection with the conduct of international trade and com-
merce be given special treatment. Special treatment would in-
clude exemption for those securities, the proceeds of which are
used to pay US persons for goods or services.i 7 It has also been
recommended, that modifications be made to other provisions
of the bill, so as to eliminate or minimize potential unintended
hardships on US business.' 8
Mr. I. W. Burnham of Burnham & Co., a well-known Wall
Street brokerage firm, believes that the proceeds derived from
the sale abroad of US owned securities, and re-invested in other
foreign securities be permitted tax free treatment. Since no ad-
ditional dollar outflow results from such a transaction, the Ad-
ministration would not be deviating in any respect from its
15 1963 Hearings 417.
16 Id. at 227.
17 Id. at 259.
1s Id. at 420.
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original purpose in enacting H.R. 8000.19 In fact, an amendment
has been suggested which would allow any United States person
to exchange a foreign security for another of like value, so long
as no additional dollar outflow is created by the transaction. 20
In addition to the suggestions already mentioned, the firm
of Smith, Barney & Co., an, organization which has been active
in the management of foreign dollar financing, and responsible
for'the public issuance of many foreign dollar issues in the United
States, had various recommendations to make with reference to
H.R. 8000. The firm's representative at the hearings, emphasized
that the exemption granted bank loans, under the present bill, be
limited to strictly commercial credit transactions or to the
financing of specific export transactions. As a consequence, bank
loans which involve maturities in excess of one year or renewals
thereof, should not be exempt from the tax. Long term foreign
issues exempted from application of the tax could be informally
limited to specific maximum amounts. Finally, the firm believes
that Japan, who is the US's second best customer, be given special
treatment, similar to that given to Canada. Considering the conse-
quences to both Japan and the United States, if such treatment
is not granted, the firm believes that the US cannot afford to take
the risks involved, and therefore special treatment should be
given to Japan.2 1
CHAPTER VI. Conclusion
What can be said in conclusion with respect to the "Interest
Equalization Tax", and the effects that it might have in solving
the balance of payments problem? As for the purpose of the tax
proposal, no problem is presented. The "Interest Equalization
Tax" represents an integral part of the late President Kennedy's
efforts to improve the balance of payments situation, and at the
same time defend our gold reserve. Needless to say, the Presi-
dent's aims were sincere, and no particular business or country
was meant to be the object of any discriminatory policy. Out of
due respect to Mr. Kennedy, his policy moves always had as
their purpose, a better and stronger America.
19 id. at 259.
20 d. at 353.
21 ld. at 471.
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However, as is true with many so-called "emergency meas-
ures", certain individuals or groups will be effected by the appli-
cation of the tax more than others. -Since the purpose of the tax
was to raise the cost of borrowing in the United States, and
thereby reduce the sale of foreign securities to American in-
vestors, the investment industry and certain countries, who have
in the past relied on the US' capital market for borrowing pur-
poses, will be effected substantially, if the tax is enacted. There-
fore, much of the criticism raised in the newspapers and at the
Hearings before the Committee on Ways and Means, came from
these groups. Wall Street Brokerage houses, dealers in foreign
securities, investment organizations, trade councils, bank presi-
dents, etc., and countries like Canada and Japan were among the
leading groups who would be adversely effected, if H.R. 8000-
was passed into law.
Much of what was said by these groups was primarily aimed
at saving their own position, for certainly much of the criticism
was raised from a self-centered point of view. All of these groups
recognized the seriousness of the payments' problem; however,
if it were possible, they hoped that the tax would not be passed, or
if passed, their particular group would be given special considera-
tion. This would be true of any business or group who would be
affected by special' legislation which could seriously hurt their
business, in one way or another.
Nevertheless, much of the criticism raised at home and over-
seas, appeared to have much merit in what was said. In reviewing
the countless arguments against the tax, it seemed quite con-
ceivable that the tax could result in serious complications, not
anticipated by the Administration, or at least not mentioned by
them. Among the serious complications which could occur are:
the effect of the tax on New York City as the financial capital
of the world and the unemployment problem that would result
in N. Y.; the effect of the tax on our exports, and the fact that
reprisals by other nations might result in a worsened payments'
position; the effect of the tax on the United States dollar in the
eyes of the free world; the effect of the tax on previously an-
nounced United States trade policy; and the effect of the tax on
US trade customers, like Japan and Canada.
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If application of the tax would result in these complications,
the above critics would be perfectly right in opposing the tax
proposal. However, it seems highly unlikely that the Adminis-
tration failed to take these adverse effects into consideration in
proposing the tax. Although the tax is still under consideration,
with passage unlikely at the present moment, evidence indicates
that the tax has already had positive effects on the deficit and on
the gold supply. As was mentioned in various newspaper articles,
the sale of new foreign securities has come to an almost com-
plete halt. In addition, the gold reserves have remained steady
since the announcement of the tax proposal on July 18th. As
for the adverse effects emphasized by the various critics, there has
been no indication that such effects have become a reality. Only
time will tell, as to whether the critics were right, in anticipating
the evils which they have found to exist in H.R. 8000. Certainly
the criticism voiced by these people should not be taken lightly,
and it should be incumbent upon the Administration to make sure
that, if enacted, the tax will not turn out to be a failure, and
thereby cause us unnecessary embarrassment and further prob-
lems.
On the other side, there is the plea by the Administration
that the "Interest Equalization Tax" is just the thing that is
needed, to reduce the payments deficit to a point where it is
considered safe. The Administration admits the difficulty of
predicting the effectiveness of the tax. However, it does feel that
the tax will definitely reduce the overall deficit and thus, reduce
the present threat to our gold reserves. The Government realizes
that the primary contributor to the deficit problem has been the
large expenditures for foreign aid and defense. However, because
of our position as leader of the free world, the United States
cannot afford to become too conservative in this area, and there-
fore, expenditures in this area must remain at a fairly constant
figure.
As has been mentioned, predicting the eventual outcome oi
the tax on the payments' problem is an impossible task. However,
it is interesting to note that despite the staunch criticism which
has been expressed since announcement of the tax on July 18th,
the House Ways and Means Committee, on December 5, 1963,
approved the tax proposal. Except for some minor technical
TAXATION
amendments, which in some cases were designed to avrt in-
dividual hardships, and in others, to clarify the bill, H.R. 8000 was
passed by the Committee intact. The Committee noted that the
mere existence of the tax proposal has been enough to completely
halt new foreign issues on the New York market; and at the same
time, has substantially improved the United States balance of
payments position. It appears that the impact of the tax proposal,
which has already been shown, has impressed Congress, and in-
dications point to eventual approval of the bill by Congress.'
The stamp of approval given to the bill by the Committee
resulted in very little reaction by the foreign stock market.
Foreign security dealers concede that lack of reaction to the Com-
mittee's report, indicates the effe'tiveness of the tax. Some deal-
ers attribute the effectiveness of the tax to its retroactive provi-
sions, while others believe the tax is more effective as a proposal,
than it would have as law.2
Therefore, it seems quite evident that pro or con, the "proof
is in the pudding". Although unenacted, the tax as a proposal
has proven quite effective. What more can one ask for? The
problem is there, and something must be done to rectify the sit-
uation. The tax proposal, from all outward appearances, seems to
be a step in the right direction. At this point, there is no other
criteria to go by, except for the success which has already been
evident by various reports. However, as has been mentioned,
the criticism expressed by many, should be examined in light
of present conditions. If it is found that the tax, as applied, is
having the effects which were feared, corrective steps can be
taken before the situation gets out of hand.
Action had to be taken; it was, and so far, its application has
proved effective-although the tax remains unenacted. After
reading the various opinions expressed about H.R. 8000, one
cannot help but agree with the critics of the tax. The more you
read, the more indoctrinated one gets, insofar as the adverse
effects of the tax are concerned. However, when you consider
the effectiveness of the tax, in the proposal stage, you cannot
help but agree with the Administration's viewpoint, that the tax
is a step in the right direction.
1 N.Y. Times, December 6, 1963, p. 56, col. 3.2 N.Y. Times, December 7, 1963, p. 41, col. 1.
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